




Eberswalde University  
for Sustainable  
Development

# Governance, Administration and Management of Biosphere Reserves and Protected Areas

Prof. Dr. Erik Aschenbrand



**2 Intro: the definition of key terms**

**3 Organisation forms of Biosphere Reserves (BRs) and Protected Areas (PAs)**

**4 Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy**

**5 Good government and good governance**

**6 Landscape governance legal foundation**

**7 Landscape governance fragmentation**

# 5 Good government and good governance

# States and good government

„The state is a hierarchical, centralized organization that holds a monopoly on legitimate force over a defined territory“ (Fukuyama 2014: 23).

# Getting to Denmark



The screenshot shows a Google Maps interface with the following elements:

- Search Bar:** "Eberswalde" and "Dänemark" are entered.
- Route Options:**

Route	Distance	Time
über A24	654 km	6 h 44 min
über A20	714 km	6 h 59 min
über A2 und A7	830 km	8 h 17 min
- Map:** Shows a blue route from Eberswalde, Germany, through Hamburg, to Copenhagen, Denmark. A red pin marks the destination in Copenhagen.
- UI Elements:** Includes a blue sidebar with navigation icons, a top bar with "Hotels", "Tankstellen", "Rastplätze", and "Mehr", and a bottom right corner with map controls.

Fukuyama, F. (2014). *Political order and political decay*. New York.

# Getting to Denmark



Denmark as a symbol for  
a well governed state:  
a „society that is  
**prosperous,**  
**democratic,**  
**secure,**  
**and well governed,**  
**and experiences low levels of corruption“**  
(Fukuyama, 2014)

# Getting to Denmark

„The **international community** would like to turn Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Haiti into idealized places like „Denmark“, but it doesn't have the slightest idea of how to bring this about.

Part of the problem is that we don't understand how Denmark itself came to be Denmark and therefore don't comprehend the complexity and difficulty of political development“ (Fukuyama 2014: 25).




Fukuyama, F. (2014): *Political order and political decay*. New York.

# Getting to Denmark



„Of Denmark’s various positive qualities, the least studied and most poorly understood concerns how its political system made the transition from a **patrimonial** to a **modern state**“ (Fukuyama 2014, p. 26).



Fukuyama, F. (2014): *Political order and political decay*. New York.




# Getting to Denmark



„How did Denmark come to be governed by bureaucrats that were characterized by:

- strict subordination to public purposes,
- technical expertise,
- a functional division of labor,
- and recruitment on the basis of merit?“ (Fukuyama 2014: 26).

# Symptoms of bad government



↔ good government

# Symptoms of bad government

- Corruption
- Wasteful spending: *white elephants*

The New York Times

## *In Spain, a Symbol of Ruin at an Airport to Nowhere*



By Raphael Minder

July 18, 2012

BBC


Sign in

NEWS

## The white elephants that dragged Spain into the red

By Pascale Harter  
BBC News, Spain

© 26 July 2012



White elephant kept by the King at Amarapura 1855.

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lord\\_White\\_Elephant.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lord_White_Elephant.jpg)

Symbol of power: sacred animal, not allowed to work but very demanding and consuming

# Corruption

„Appropriation of public resources for private gain“ (Fukuyama 2014: 83)

# Corruption

„Appropriation of public resources for private gain“ (Fukuyama 2014: 83)



Hyacinthe Rigaud (ca. 1700):  
*Louis XIV*  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Louis\\_XIV\\_of\\_France.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Louis_XIV_of_France.jpg)

*“To celebrate his victory over Spain, Louis XIV wanted to organise a party worthy of it, and he spent on it the enormous sum of 117,000 Livres – a third of the budget for Versailles in 1668. The king also wanted the festivities to stand out distinctly from the party of 1664”* (Chateaux de Versailles, 2021).

(Chateaux de Versailles 2021:  
<http://en.chateauversailles.fr/discover/history/key-dates/great-royal-entertainment> )

Fukuyama, F. (2014): *Political order and political decay*. New York.



GCH P (2010) /Myrabelle (2011): Chateaux de Versailles.  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Versailles-Chateau-Jardins02\\_\(cropped\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Versailles-Chateau-Jardins02_(cropped).jpg)  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chateau\\_Versailles\\_Galerie\\_des\\_Glaces.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chateau_Versailles_Galerie_des_Glaces.jpg)

→ Is this corruption?

# Corruption

„Appropriation of public resources for private gain“ (Fukuyama 2014: 83)

- This definition implies distinction between **public** and **private**,
- exists only in modern or modernizing states.



L'état c'est moi!

[...]  
„He could give away lands (and the people living on them) to relatives, supporters, or rivals because they were a form of private property“  
(Fukuyama 2014: 83).

Hyacinthe Rigaud (ca. 1700):  
*Louis XIV*  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Louis\\_XIV\\_of\\_France.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Louis_XIV_of_France.jpg)

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17./18. century:  
legitimacy of sovereigns in early modern state  
doctrines of state sovereignty

Legitimacy based on  
ancient or inherited  
ownership rights



Legitimacy based on  
the sovereigns role  
as a guardian of a  
larger public interest

# Rent-seeking

What is a rent?



# What is a rent?

## Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations (1776), Chapter 6

“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce.

The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them.

He must then pay for the license to gather them; and must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the **rent of land**, and in the price of the greater part of commodities makes a third component part”.

Quote: <https://www.adamsmithworks.org/documents/chapter-vi-of-the-component-parts-of-the-price-of-commodities>

On the rent of land: <https://www.adamsmithworks.org/documents/chapter-xi-of-the-rent-of-land>

# What is a rent?

→ More generally: 
$$\begin{array}{r} \text{Market price} \\ - \text{Production cost} \\ \hline = \text{rent} \end{array}$$

→ possession of productive land allows to gain rent of land

# What is a rent?

→ More generally: 
$$\frac{\text{Market price}}{\text{Production cost}} = \text{rent}$$

→ possession of productive land allows to gain rent of land

**“Rent-seeking means seeking to increase one's share of existing wealth without creating new wealth.”**



How can i receiveth coins, i wond'r?

# Governments create rents (Fukuyama 2014, 85-86)

## Governments

**can and do create rents frequently** through: taxation, licensing, patents, copyrights → direct rents

**Any government regulation creates scarcities** and hence influences rents:

regulations, project funding, subsidies, certification of products (permissions for medicine)


# Governments create rents (Fukuyama 2014, 85-86)

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
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## Governments

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Overall purpose of the rents created and distributed by governments:

Generating a private good appropriated by individuals

Serving the broader public purpose

# Rent-seeking

Definition of **rent-seeking adjective** from the Oxford Advanced Learner's

Dictionary

**rent-seeking** *adjective*

 /'rent si:kɪŋ/

 /'rent si:kɪŋ/

*(disapproving, economics)*

★ trying to change or control public policy or economic conditions in order to increase your own profits

- *These processes amount to rent-seeking behaviour by multinational corporations.*


[https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/rent-seeking\\_1?q=rent-seeking](https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/rent-seeking_1?q=rent-seeking)

Related but not equal to corruption


What is patronage?



# What is patronage?



# What is clientelism?



## Clientelism:

Differentiated from patronage by scale

Patronage: face-to-face relationships, exist in all regimes - democratic and authoritarian

## Clientelism


- Benefits to political supporters in exchange for votes



## Programmatic agendas

- Broad concepts of justice or the general good

# Patronage and clientelism as a default form of sociability?




Fukuyama (2014): not the occurrence of patronage and clientelism needs to be explained but the development of modern **impersonal institutions**

„To choose a highly qualified employee over a friend or relative, or to work in an impersonal bureaucracy – is a socially constructed behaviour that runs counter to our natural inclinations.

It is only with the development of political institutions like the modern state that humans begin to organize themselves and learn to cooperate in a manner that transcends friends and family. When institutions break down, we revert to patronage and nepotism as a default form of sociability“ (Fukuyama 2014, p. 88-89)

# Patronage and clientelism – harmful form: prebendalism




No strict differentiation from clientelism

Term to describe:

- Using government power to steal public resources
- Lacking accountability towards larger group of clients
- Neopatrimonialism

Government:  
interaction of  
politicians and  
bureaucrats  
at various levels



# Government: interaction of politicians and bureaucrats at various levels



## Politicians



**Corruption** can  
happen in both  
spheres

## Bureaucrats

Government:  
interaction of  
politicians and  
bureaucrats  
at various levels



Politicians



**Corruption** can  
happen in both  
spheres

Bureaucrats

Politicians



**Worst case:**  
Cooperation in  
corruptive behaviour

Bureaucrats

Politicians



**Best case:**  
Mutual monitoring

Bureaucrats

How to create  
incentives for **mutual  
monitoring?**

**Closed or  
weberian** ?  
bureaucracy

# Open and closed bureaucracies

## **Closed:**

Special employment laws for public sector:

- Lifelong contracts
- Career protected from external competition
- Specified entrance conditions: degrees and training courses
- Entering public service via concours at the beginning of the career

## **Open:**

- Posts are open to competition from inside and outside the public sector
- Fewer or no special employment laws for public sector



# Integrated and separated bureaucracies

## Integrated:

- Changing from high level bureaucratic positions to political positions is common
- Being part of a political party is helpful to gain high level administrative positions

## Separated:

- High level bureaucrats are not allowed to be member of political parties
- Fewer positions can be appointed by election-winning politicians
- Career paths divided between politicians and bureaucrats

We are talking about **degrees of separation** - not about totally integrated or totally separated systems

→ Which institutions are separating or integrating the political and bureaucratic spheres?

# Major issue: **recruitment and advancement**

- meritocratic or political?

„Prussia is considered the first country in modern European history to have elaborated and applied a **merit system** (Fischer and Lundgren 1975). Rules for recruitment were very strict almost from the start. In particular it was the judiciary that was the first section of the Prussian state to establish the merit system, and by 1775 every candidate had to pass two examinations (Finer 1932)“ (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017, 44f.).

Additionally:

- Rules for protecting public servants from being arbitrarily fired (established under absolutist rule of Hohenzollern dynasty)
- Firing a public servant cannot be done by executive but only by a well-founded **judicial sentence** (Dahlström & Lapuente 2017, 45)

Dahlström, C. & Lapuente, V. (2017): *Organizing leviathan. Politicians, Bureaucrats and the making of good government*. Cambridge.

Fischer, W & Lundgren, P. (1975): *The Recruitment of Administrative Personnel*. In: Tilly, C. (Ed). *The formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton. 456-561.

Finer, H. (1932): *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*. London.

# Two dimensions of bureaucracy

according to Dahlström and Lapuente (2017, 38)

	open	closed
integrated	<p><b>1. Patronage</b> For example, Tammany Hall party machines in the US, pre-“public-service bargain“ Britain and most of Western Europe during the nineteenth century, and currently many emerging countries</p>	<p><b>2. Corporatist</b> For example, countries with a relatively high politicization of the administration and bureaucratization of politics, such as France, Spain, Italy, Japan</p>
separated	<p><b>3. Managerial</b> For example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden where the personnel systems are private-like but still have clearly different career paths for politicians and bureaucrats</p>	<p><b>4. Autonomous</b> For example, closed systems with clear limits for the politicization of the administration and for the bureaucratization of politics, such as in Germany or South Korea</p>

# Weberianess

“Researchers agree that establishing public bureaucracies organized with Weberian principles is a necessary condition for state capacity and quality of government”

Received: 20 June 2020 | Revised: 20 December 2020 | Accepted: 30 December 2020

DOI: 10.1111/gove.12572

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Governance WILEY

## **Democracy and bureaucracy in newly industrialized countries: A systematic comparison between Latin America and East Asia**

**Alexandre de Avila Gomide<sup>1,2</sup>** 

“A Weberian bureaucracy is characterized as:

- merit-based,
- rule-bounded,
- and impartial.

Contrarily, in a patronage-based one, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is based on personal reciprocity and clientelism.

According to Max Weber, merit and patronage-based bureaucracies imply two differing modes of legitimation of the state: legal-rationalism and neopatrimonialism, respectively” (Gomide 2021: 2).

## Gomide (2021: 13) on **Brasil**

“Grindle (2010, 2012) observes that Brazil began an effort to end patronage practice in the late 1930s, during the Vargas' authoritarian regime. After this, other administrative reforms have, in some way, succeeded in professionalizing the civil service (e.g., the 1967 reform conducted by the military). Despite the patronage system surviving in parallel with an expanding career system, the **democratic Constitution of 1998 included civil servants' meritocratic recruitment** (Grindle, 2010).

These factors may explain the considerable stability and professionalism that characterize much of the central government's bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, as Grindle (2010) states, the **civil service continues to coexist with extensive opportunities for personal appointments outside the career system (cargos em comissao~ )—and not just for the top level of governments and public organizations, as it happens in all modern political systems.** This fact can be explained by the country's presidents' challenges in building parliamentary majorities due to a fragmented party system. In Brazil, legislators use patronage as a bargaining chip to support government bills (Praça et al., 2011)”.

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These factors may explain the considerable stability and professionalism of the government's bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, as Grindle (2010) states, the **civil service continues to consist of personal appointments outside the career system (cargos em comissão) in all federal governments and public organizations, as it happens in all modern patrimonial systems**, explained by the country's presidents' challenges in building parliamentary majorities due to a fragmented party system. In Brazil, legislators use patronage as a bargaining chip to support government bills (Praça et al., 2011)”.

Writing tips:

- get inspired by the wording and logical structure of publications

# Gomide (2021: 13) on **South Korea** and **Taiwan**

“The presence of strong and Weberian characteristics has already been explored in the literature on authoritarian developmental states' success in Asian Tigers (Evans, 1995). Hellmann (2020) and Templeman (2020) **reveal that the introduction of democracy initially caused a decline in state capacity in South Korea and Taiwan,**

**primarily because the sudden jump in electoral competition strengthened politicians' and parties' incentives to engage in particularistic activities.**

However, after a maturation phase, democratic institutions reinforced the state's capacity to defend against political elites' narrow interests demands”.

# Gomide (2021: 14) on **nonoccurrence of bureaucratic weberianess**

“In straightforward language,

- **non-institutionalized party systems**
- **and ethnic politics, or ethnic conflicts and electoral competition,**
- **or the nonexistence of professional public service before democratization and electoral competition**

**imply the nonoccurrence of a high level of bureaucratic weberianess** in the studied countries.

Thailand and Indonesia are typical cases of the first solution term, Malaysia of the second, and Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines of the third causal pathway.”



# Gomide (2021: 14) on factors potentially influencing the development of functional state administrations

“Argentina and Mexico are both outside, and the Philippines is more outside than inside the high Weberian bureaucracies set.

**At the time of democratization, these countries had not yet consolidated a professional civil service according to the Bureaucracy Quality component of the ICRG dataset (see Table 3).**

**As discussed, countries like these have much higher problems achieving a rational-legal administration than those that inherited it from authoritarian times”.**

# Woodrow Wilson 1886

## on public opinion and institutional change

- **“Wherever regard for public opinion is a first principle of government, practical reform must be slow and all reform must be full of compromises.** For wherever public opinion exists it must rule. This is now an axiom half the world over, and will presently come to be believed even in Russia. Whoever would effect a change in a modern constitutional government must first educate his fellow-citizens to want *some* change. That done, he must persuade them to want the particular change he wants. He must first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the right things. He must stir it up to search for an opinion, and then manage to put the right opinion in its way”.
- Important aspects with regard to **system competition**

# Gomide (2021: 16) on **Chile**

“(...) the return to democracy in 1990 as **patronage** aided recolonizing the government with those committed to the new regime. However, things changed in 2002 with a political scandal. This political scandal arose from the practice of offering “envelope salaries,” an informal system to attract well-qualified people to the government by delivering extra-cash to high-level officials (Grindle, 2010) [...] This scandal became a window of opportunity [...] **a new legislation** passed within a few weeks in 2003 and came into effect in January 2004 (Grindle, 2010).

**It establishes that every public employee must be selected after passing a competitive exam, following equality and nondiscrimination principles. Besides, the new law establishes that promotions will only occur after an internal competitive exam.** Nevertheless, political appointments still coexist with the new system since the president can even directly appoint “trusted staff” (Fonseca, 2013). The Chilean case demonstrates that the presence of an institutionalized party system and electoral competition is not sufficient to bring about a meritocratic-based civil service in new democracies. As stated by Fukuyama (2014), building a Weberian bureaucracy after the advent of democracy requires both political mobilizations of new social actors and political leadership. In Chile's case, public opinion or voters' demand was crucial for civil service reform. Therefore, the Chilean case proves that the missing condition to distinguish Mexico's is **public pressure or the voters' demand for reform**”.

# Good governance



# Governance: outlook

... in practice:



“It is the combination of legal and economic incentives with other interpretative, knowledge and participatory incentives that are important for **effective governance**. (...)

Just as diversity is the key to resilience for species and ecosystems, a diverse governance approach with multiple incentives combining the role of people, markets and the state is the key to **best-practice governance**” (Day et al. 2015, 626).

Day, J. C., Laffoley, D., Zischka, K., Gilliland, P., Gjerde, K., Jones, P., ... & Wilhelm, A. (2015). *Marine protected area management*. ANU Press. referring to

Jones, P. J. S., Qiu, W. and de Santo, E. M. (2011). *Governing marine protected areas: getting the balance right*, Technical Report, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi.

# Good governance



“The ecological, economic and social benefits of protected areas can only be enhanced and sustained when they are effectively managed through good governance” (Mulongoy and Gidda 2008: 28).

# Good governance



“Usually governance means government plus something else: public policies, institutions, a system of economic relationships, or a role for the non-governmental sector in the business of the state.

‘Good governance’ thus expresses approval not only for a type of government (usually democracy) and its related political values (for example respect for human rights), but also for **certain kinds of additional components**” (Smith 2007: 3).

# Good governance

Which normative criteria can be used to assess the quality of governance types? (Knill & Tosun 2015, 177)

## Politically and scientifically controversial:

- a variety of basic requirements and principles for good governance
- formulated in particular by international organisations
- for the **World Bank** a prerequisite for granting loans (overview and discussion: Czada, 2010)



# Good governance

## Still evolving concept! (Katsamunska 2016, 139):

- first appeared in the documents of United Nations' development activities, in the documents of the World Bank (WB) in 1992 and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996
- emphasising the importance of **participation, consultation, transparency and the rule of law**
- as equally important as **administrative and service efficiency**
- in case of WB and IMF attempt to conceptualise it as a modified version of new public management

## World Governance Indicators



**THE WORLD BANK**


IBRD • IDA | WORLD BANK GROUP

# Good governance

Which normative criteria can be used to assess the quality of governance types?  
(Knill & Tosun 2015, 177)

# Good governance

Which normative criteria can be used to assess the quality of governance types?  
(Knill & Tosun 2015, 177)



# Good governance

## a) Democratic legitimation

- ✓ the scope, range and diversity of included stakeholders
- ✓ equal possibilities of participation (not all stakeholders have the same resources)
- ✓ insider and outsider – problematic if not all affected actors integrated (Papadopoulos, 2013)
- ✓ exercise of control rights – democratic legitimation through controlling and sanctioning the actions of political decision-makers (e.g. by parliament)

# Good governance

## b) Decision-making capacity

- ✓ assumed to be higher if decision-making competences are delegated to the affected stakeholders: *The greater the opportunities for the stakeholders to specify the content of the decision, the less likely it is that these stakeholders will mobilise political resistance to the decision under discussion* (Knill & Tosun 2015, 178).
- ✓ The risk of blockades is lower in forced negotiation systems than in voluntary networks.
- ✓ ...especially high in negotiation systems that decide according to a consensus or one-vote principle – need of specific instruments to avoid or overcome blockades (Mayntz 2010, 44)  
– studies on participation (tools)!

Knill, C., & Tosun, J. (2015). *Einführung in die Policy-Analyse* (Vol. 4136). utb.

Mayntz, R. (2010). *Governance im modernen Staat*: In: Benz, Arthur; Dose, Nicolai (Hg.): *Governance-Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung*. 2., aktualisierte Auflage.

# Good governance

## c) Effectiveness of implementation

How well or poorly are decisions implemented by the executive administration and the affected stakeholders? Influencing factors:

- ✓ Interventionist regulation – advantages of detailed and legally binding rules;
- ✓ intrinsic incentives to comply with rules – assumed to be high if the affected stakeholders are integrated in the policy creation process



Eberswalde University  
for Sustainable  
Development

# Thank you for your attention!

