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Megaprojects & the Role of the Public

Germany's Embattled 'Stuttgart 21' Rail Project

On a chill Tuesday in February 2010, Günther Oettinger, premier of the southwest German state of Baden-Württemberg, and Wolfgang Schuster, mayor of Stuttgart, the state's capital and economic center, surely sighed in relief. For more than 20 years, state and city leaders had negotiated with Germany's national railway over the routing and station design of the Stuttgart segment of the European Magistrale, a 930-mile cross-Europe high-speed rail line that would one day extend from Paris through Munich and Vienna to Budapest and Bratislava. In the course of the long, on-and-off negotiation, Baden-Württemberg's preferred option had periodically won the favor of the railway giant, only to lose it again as political priorities fluctuated and leadership at the national railway changed. To move the project forward, the governments of Baden-Württemberg and Stuttgart had eventually agreed to pay a share of the project's costs—a first in German history. But it wasn't until the formal groundbreaking on February 2, 2010, attended by dignitaries from all levels of government, that the venture finally felt secure.

Dubbed "Stuttgart 21," the project was a massive undertaking that would route the new high-speed rail line underground through Stuttgart city center. This would entail moving the existing downtown railway station below ground and creating a network of tunnels to accommodate the new high-speed through-lines, a line to the Stuttgart international airport, and many existing surface lines. The City of Stuttgart had bought most of the land that would be freed-up above ground—about 210 acres of prime downtown real estate—for eventual redevelopment.

Even as government leaders were celebrating the launch of Stuttgart 21, however, trouble was brewing—trouble that, within the year, would spark the largest citizen demonstrations Germany had seen since the reunification of the country. The Stuttgart 21 opponents were diverse, and so were their concerns, but nearly all were united by one overriding contention: that political elites had conceived the plan without public input and had later refused to take citizen objections seriously.[1]

April 1994: The Birth of Stuttgart 21

Stuttgart, the capital and economic heart of Germany's prosperous state of Baden-Württemberg, is located in a narrow river valley with mountains to either side, which had long made it a trouble-spot for railway engineers. As a consequence, Stuttgart had become a regional terminus rather than a through-station. There were 17 different track lines in Stuttgart's railway station, located in the center of the city, but all entering trains had to reverse to leave the station. To the delight of leaders in Baden-Württemberg and Stuttgart, the Transport Ministry released a

[1] See Exhibit 1 for a glossary of names and political parties mentioned in this case. See Exhibit 2 for a chronology of events.

This case was written by Pamela Varley, Senior Case Writer, for Quinton Mayne, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, for use at the John F. Kennedy School of Government (HKS), Harvard University. HKS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. (August 2013)

new plan in 1985 that made it a top priority to route the east-west European Magistrale through Stuttgart, which meant creating a through-station in the city.

Engineers from West Germany's railway authority—then the Bundesbahn—set to work on a plan and in 1988 submitted their proposal to Baden-Württemberg. The idea: to bypass Stuttgart's problematic existing station and instead build a new station well north of downtown. Under the plan, the Bundesbahn would upgrade an existing regional rail line northeast of the city to allow high-speed travel, rather than build an all-new high-speed line. [See Exhibit 3 for background on high-speed rail development in Germany.]

To the political leaders of Baden-Württemberg and Stuttgart, this idea was extremely disappointing, for several reasons. Although one of the most prosperous and attractive areas in Germany, the population of Stuttgart was slowly shrinking (while surrounding suburban areas grew) and the average age, slowly rising. Thus, political leaders in the city and state were actively seeking to rejuvenate Stuttgart and cultivate new industries alongside traditional corporate anchors, such as Daimler, Porsche, and Robert Bosch. They wanted to invigorate the downtown core and develop a new nexus of commercial activity near the Stuttgart international airport, southeast of town. To bolster these efforts, they wanted to modernize their downtown train station and maintain it as the region's primary transport node. They wanted the European Magistrale to stop right in the heart of Stuttgart, with seamless links to regional rail lines. And they wanted a second stop out by the airport.

To the engineers at the Bundesbahn, this idea was needlessly complex and expensive; a six-year stalemate ensued. In an odd twist of fate, it was Germany's reunification in 1990 that finally set the stage for a resolution. In 1994, Germany joined the Bundesbahn in West Germany with the beleaguered East German railway authority to create a single, more profit-oriented, publicly owned company called Deutsche Bahn, led by CEO Heinz Dürr, a prominent Baden-Württemberg industrialist. With respect to the Stuttgart portion of the European Magistrale, Dürr acceded to Baden-Württemberg's wishes with a proposal, dubbed "Stuttgart 21," to route the new high-speed rail line underground through Stuttgart city center, then build a new line southeast of the city to Ulm, with a stop on the way at the Stuttgart international airport. In addition, he proposed that the entire existing station be modernized and moved below ground and that a network of tunnels be constructed to accommodate the new high-speed through-lines, the line to the Stuttgart airport, and many existing surface lines. To offset the costs of this ambitious plan, Deutsche Bahn would re-develop the freed-up land above ground—prime real estate in downtown Stuttgart.[2]

Dürr quickly secured the backing of the federal Transport Minister Matthias Wissman (also a Baden-Württemberg native), Stuttgart Mayor Manfred Rommel, and Baden-Württemberg Premier Erwin Teufel. In a surprise press conference in April 1994, the four leaders jointly unveiled the ambitious Stuttgart 21 proposal to the public.

A Methodical March Forward, 1995-1997

After the April 1994 announcement, Deutsche Bahn presided over a working group comprising federal, state, and city planners that conducted a feasibility study on the proposal—looking at engineering considerations, transportation impacts, business issues, and costs. By January 1995, Deutsche Bahn had concluded that the plan was feasible on all counts. It would reduce travel time between Stuttgart and Ulm from 54 to 28 minutes, and between

[2] In fact, Dürr developed similar plans in about a half dozen cities—including Frankfurt, Munich, and Mannheim. These "21" projects all aimed to upgrade gritty old railway stations by putting them underground—and to offset the cost by re-developing the land on top.

downtown Stuttgart and the airport from 27 to 8 minutes. The City of Stuttgart developed a more concrete planning framework. After that, federal, state, regional, and city representatives set to work on a financial agreement.

A key tension in this financial negotiation concerned the redevelopment of Deutsche Bahn's above-ground land once the tracks were removed. Under the German system, municipalities were accorded much authority in deciding how property within their borders was developed. Deutsche Bahn's leaders, however, knew the railway giant would only recoup profits from its sale of the real estate if the new owner was free to undertake a profitable commercial development. Thus, according to Wolfgang Schuster, who would serve as mayor of Stuttgart from 1997 to 2013, Deutsche Bahn felt it needed a legal guarantee from the City of Stuttgart that it would not block lucrative development of the property. For its part, the city wanted to retain as much control of the parcel as possible.[3] Under some pressure, the parties signed an agreement on November 7, 1995, aimed at allowing Deutsche Bahn to recoup an estimated €1 billion in real estate sales to offset construction costs for the project, then-estimated at €2.5 billion. The city agreed to allow the development of residential units—enough to house 11,000 residents—and commercial development sufficient to generate 24,000 new jobs. Beyond these commitments, however, the city retained a strong hand in the urban design of the area.[4]

At this point, the Stuttgart 21 proposal, for the first time, drew local opposition. In particular, left-leaning critics were alarmed at the idea of a massive urban redevelopment project driven so baldly by Deutsche Bahn's need for profits. As it was, the critics believed, recent urban development in the city had tilted too far in the direction of modern high-rise commercial development, not enough in the direction of sustainable building and affordable housing, said Hannes Rockenbauch,[5] who would later become a city councilor and leading critic of Stuttgart 21. In November 1995, about 15 activists created a political advocacy group called Umkehr Stuttgart, or "Stuttgart, Turn Back." One of the leaders, Winfried Wolf, a transportation spokesman for the Party of Democratic Socialism[6] (PDS), expressed concern at the time that Stuttgart 21 was driven entirely "from above."

> This approach is redolent of a pre-democratic era. In contrast, we are calling for open public debate on the project. This means that saying no to Stuttgart 21 must be possible and the final decisions must lie with democratically legitimate parliaments or, in the last resort, with the people.[7]

Stuttgart, Turn Back was small, however, and political leaders paid little heed.

The Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan. Early in 1996, with a basic planning template in hand, the City of Stuttgart invited 10 top European urban design studios to come up with a basic design for the 250 acres of new development land. The city also appointed a commission of experts to review these designs and recommend their first choice to the City Council. Between August and October of 1996, these designs were made widely available

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[3] Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Wolfgang Schuster are drawn from an interview with Quinton Mayne, conducted June 27, 2013 in Stuttgart.

[4] "Case Study Stuttgart/Baden-Wurttemberg," in *Planning the Integration of the High-Speed Train: A Discourse/Analytic Study in Four European Regions,* by M. Wolfram, dissertation, Fakultät Architektur und Stadtplanung, Universität Stuttgart, 2003, pp. 146-184.

[5] Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Hannes Rockenbauch were drawn from an interview with Quinton Mayne, conducted June 26, 2013 in Stuttgart.

[6] This party was re-named, simply, the Left Party in 2005.

[7] Stuckenbrock, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 15-76, translated by Quinton Mayne.

for public review via exhibits, guided tours, and presentations. More than 15,000 citizens reviewed the plans in one way or another. In January 1997, on the recommendation of the appointed commission, Stuttgart City Council selected one of the ten as the "master design." This Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan organized development around two new neighborhoods—one residential, one with a blend of housing, retail, and office space—and extended Stuttgart's signature park, the Schloβgarten. In February 1997, also on the recommendation of the commission, the City Council directed the city to use this design as the basis of an official public participation process, open to any interested city resident.

The Open Participation Process for Stuttgart 21, March to June 1997

The kickoff meeting for the participatory process, on March 4, 1997, drew a larger crowd (some attendees had to stand) and a more voluble one than city officials had expected. At one point, a member of the audience rose to say, "If the administration and City Council really want to take citizens seriously, then they should do everything within their power to hold a referendum on Stuttgart 21"—a remark that received enthusiastic applause.

Wolfgang Schuster, who had begun his first term as Mayor of Stuttgart in January 1997, and Richard Reschl, the city-hired head of *KommunalEntwickung BW*, a private firm that specialized in facilitating large-scale public processes, explained the ground rules governing the process. It was to be a serious and carefully structured opportunity for the citizens of Stuttgart to influence the Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan, they explained. Far from a one-off meeting to gather opinions, the citizens would be given 12 weeks to ask questions, discuss, and weigh in on the current framework plan. As Schuster would later put it, "Citizen participation isn't a one-shot exercise, rather it is integral to a democratic culture of planning."[8] The recommendations that grew out of this process, Schuster and Reschl explained, would be carefully reviewed by the Stuttgart Urban Planning Department, which would propose revisions to the plan, based on these recommendations. The City Council would then vote on the revised plan in the early summer.

But Schuster and Reschl also made it clear that the underlying decisions about Stuttgart 21, pertaining to the routing of the rail lines and the underground design of the new train station, were *not* up for debate; in accordance with the procedures governing national railway planning, these decisions had been made by way of a lengthy negotiation among technical experts and political leaders from the city of Stuttgart, the state of Baden-Württemberg, and the public railway company, Deutsche Bahn.

Stuttgart, Turn Back was well-represented at the March 4, 1997 kickoff meeting. Afterward, Rockenbauch recalls, the group was divided about what to do. Some members argued that, despite their reservations, it was important to join the Open Participation Process, so as to continue to have a voice. Others felt strongly that they ought not participate in a process predicated on the assumption that Stuttgart 21 was already a *fait accompli* and therefore not up for discussion. In the end, the group agreed to let its members make their own personal decisions about whether or not to join the public process. Rockenbauch, just 17-years-old at the time, chose to participate, hoping that city officials might be persuaded to re-think the fundamentals of the plan if presented with thoughtful and persuasive arguments.

[8] Forward to the city administration's recommendations for amending the Framework Plan, based on the Open Participation Process, June 30, 1997, translated by Quinton Mayne. http://www.rosensteinstuttgart.de/fileadmin/downloads/1997_Offene_Buergerbeteiligung_S21_Staedtebau/GRDrs%20286%201997/1997__Offene_Buergerbeteiligung_Rahmenplanbeschluesse.pdf, retrieved July 8, 2014.

The process, itself. Over a period of 12 weeks, some 400 citizens stepped forward to participate. They divided into working groups on nine topics. In 6 of the 9 topics, interest was high enough to create two groups. (Interest was especially high in some of the more technical areas—e.g., urban design and traffic planning—perhaps not surprising, given the unusually high number of architects and urban planning experts living in Stuttgart.[9])

- Youth and S21 (one group)
- Women's concerns (one group)
- Seniors and S21 (one group)
- Education, social issues, and culture (two groups)
- Energy and environment (two groups)
- Work and economy (two groups)
- Cityscape and design (two groups)
- Traffic (two groups)
- Housing (two groups)

Under the guidance of *Kommunalentwicklung BW*, each of the 15 working groups elected a speaker, to represent the group, and a secretary, to take detailed minutes at each meeting. Most groups met between seven and nine times. On average, each of the 400 participants spent 28 hours in meetings and 4 hours on site visits. Each group was allowed to request additional information from the city and, over the course of the 12-week process, 17 city officials and 13 external experts responded to such requests. In addition to the working group meetings, there were two plenary sessions—meetings that included all participants. At the first of these plenary sessions, held on April 9, the participants shared interim recommendations and at the second, held on June 3, the citizens formally approved the final recommendations.

All meetings were moderated by KBW, which also facilitated the sharing of minutes among working groups. According to Rockenbauch, the discussions were quite open and wide-ranging. KBW did not place any limits on the groups' ability to make recommendations, even if they fell outside the mandate from the city. But the consultant did help the groups organize the recommendations into two broad categories—those that were uncontroversial (that is, recommended by at least one group and unopposed by any other group) and those that were at least somewhat controversial (recommended by one group but opposed by at least one other group). In addition, the process yielded a third category: ideas that were not yet ripe for recommendation, but, in the opinion of at least one of the working groups, deserving of further examination. The 15 group speakers met twice, during the 12 weeks, to share information and to settle on procedures for dividing the suggestions among these three categories.

On May 23, 1997, KBW gave a copy of the draft recommendations and minute notes to Stuttgart's Urban Planning Department, so city planners could get a head start on preparing the city's response and recommendations to the City Council. On June 3, 1997, KBW formally presented the results of the Open Participation Process to the city in two volumes. The first contained all 900 recommendations from the working groups. The second volume contained all the meeting minutes from the working group meetings. These thick volumes, numbering nearly 600 pages in all, were given to the Stuttgart city administration, the City Council, and the district councils in the central, northern, and eastern parts of Stuttgart. In addition, copies were given to Deutsche Bahn and to all the authorities and consultative bodies connected with the Stuttgart 21 project.

[9] "Stuttgart 21's Tunnel Vision," by Oliver Lowenstein, *Unstructured.5/Sitelines*, online design blog, undated, http://www.fourthdoor.co.uk/unstructured/unstructured_05/sitelines/stuttgart21.php, retrieved August 28, 2013.

Also on June 3, the public participants met in one last plenary session, where they took two final votes. First, they voted that the solicitation of public opinion should not end with this set of recommendations, but should continue throughout the planning process. Second, they asked that the City Council postpone its scheduled vote on July 24, 1997, in order to allow time for the city to review the issues identified as needing more research and examination.

Public recommendations & city response. The working groups developed 900 recommendations in all, though many of these overlapped or duplicated one another. While the vast majority of the recommendations was unopposed by any other working group [see Exhibit 4], about 15 percent were opposed by at least one working group, according to Stuckenbrock. One example of these was a proposal to ban high-rise buildings and another, to preserve, in entirety, the existing railway station. The last category—some 17 ideas put forward as needing further research and examination—included topics such as the creation of a health clinic on former Post Office land, and a study of how the new train station design was likely to affect women's use of the train system.

Under considerable deadline pressure, the Stuttgart Urban Planning Department pored through the recommendations and systematically responded to them one by one. Each was placed in one of six categories: recommendations that, pending City Council approval, would be incorporated in the new version of the Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan; recommendations that were effectively already included in the draft Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan published January 31, 1997; recommendations/ideas for further exploration that were deferred to future stages of planning; recommendations that went beyond the scope of the Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan and thus could not be incorporated in the plan; recommendations not accepted in whole or in part; and a catch-all category, "other."

On June 30, 1997, the city administration released its official 150-page response to the public recommendations, alongside a revised version of the Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan.[10] According to Stuckenbrock, about 15 percent of the recommendations were accepted as additions to the plan, and another 15 percent were, in fact, already in the plan. New additions included:

- a proposal that smaller parcels be included in the development mix in order to cultivate variety,
- that experimental housing design be encouraged,
- that the development area include car-free zones,
- that mixed income housing be included, along with
- housing for the elderly and disabled and
- housing that encouraged intergenerational mixing.

Recommendations already in the original plan included:

- building low energy buildings,
- green roofs,
- mixed-use developments,
- developments featuring short commuting distance between residences and job locations,
- dense cycle paths,
- building heights in line with others in the area,
- connectivity with the northern part of the city, and

[10] In addition to the recommendations that came out of the Open Participation Process, the city administration also considered recommendations from other public agencies and authorities, including the national Post Office, state Office for the Preservation of Monuments, conservation agencies, regional authorities, and the city's 23 district councils.

- preservation of the central section of the old railway station.

The city report did not recommend the inclusion of about two-thirds of the citizen proposals for a variety of reasons. About 15 percent were deemed too far outside the political mainstream, according to Stuckenbrock. Some were rejected because city planners considered them unwise, illegal, or unworkable (e.g., a proposal that 51 percent of development land be sold to women). About 20 percent were set aside because—however interesting the ideas might be—they fell beyond the scope of the framework plan. One example was a suggestion that the city acquire the entire Deutsche Bahn parcel, itself, in order to maximize its control over the development. Some recommendations pertained to the train station, rather than the urban re-development project, and these would be "forwarded to Deutsche Bahn" for consideration in the separate planning process for the train station itself, according to the city report. Another large group of recommendations—about 35 percent—was deferred for consideration in future stages of the planning process, because these proposals were deemed too specific or detailed for inclusion in the framework plan (e.g., a recommendation that construction materials be long-lasting, environmentally friendly, and recyclable).

In his cover letter to the City Council, appended to the city planners' response, Mayor Schuster summarized the city's approach, and made two additional comments. The citizen recommendation that the City Council delay its vote on the Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan, in order to give the city time to research the concerns and considerations raised by the citizen groups, was rejected—partly because the city had made a commitment to complete the framework plan by July. In addition, Schuster wrote, adopting the framework plan was just the first step in a longer planning process; the city would still have plenty of time to examine these and other concerns in future stages of the process.

In response to the citizens' suggestion that public participation be a part of future stages of planning, Schuster gave reassurance that this was the city's intention. In fact, he added, the city was in the process of developing an open citizen participation process that would begin in a few months' time for the neighborhood most affected by the new development—the North Railway Quarter.[11]

City Council action. Between June 30 and July 22, the City Council's Environmental and Technical Services Committee—a committee made up of parties elected to the City Council—met to deliberate on the city's recommendations with respect to the Open Participation Process recommendations. On July 22, this committee forwarded a list of 12 amendments to the city's revised Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan. [See Exhibit 5.]

The revised framework plan, together with the 12 amendments put forward by the Environmental and Technical Services Committee, were approved by the City Council on July 24, 1997.

Planning for the New Train Station

In parallel with the development of the urban redevelopment Framework Plan, including the Open Participation Process, Stuttgart also moved forward on the development of the new Stuttgart train station. In February 1997, the city had put out a request for bids for the design of the new train station. In November 1997, on the unanimous advice of a design jury, the city selected a design for a simple, streamlined underground facility, fed by natural light from ground-level portals.

[11] This process would take place between January 20 and April 7, 1998. Approximately 45 participants would work together over the course of six evenings. A final set of recommendations was produced and given to the city on April 22, 1998.

At this point, a group promoting sustainable transportation, Verkehrs Club Deutschland, joined with Stuttgart, Turn Back to develop an alternative to Stuttgart 21. Their idea—less grand and less expensive—was to modernize the existing downtown train station and rail network in stages, so that it could accommodate high-speed trains, but keep the station and tracks above ground. Under this alternative plan, named Kopfbahnhof 21 (or Terminus 21), a partial redevelopment of downtown land would still be possible, as many old tracks were no longer necessary. But the redevelopment would encompass about half as much land (about 120 acres) and—K21 advocates argued—could be designed without the financial pressures or time constraints of the Stuttgart 21 project.[12]

Shift in public opinion. While the K21 proposal did not receive serious attention from political leaders, the city was keeping an eye on public opinion. In a 1995 city-run survey with responses from 2,209 residents, 52 percent viewed the Stuttgart 21 project positively and 30 percent, negatively, while 18 percent were unsure.[13] A second survey, sent out in April 1997, showed a marked shift from "positive" to "unsure." Of the 2,364 residents who responded to the survey, 38 percent saw Stuttgart 21 positively, 33 percent negatively; and 29 percent were unsure.[14]

At the time, a city analysis attributed the shift to the high degree of public and media attention the project had received in the intervening two years: "Since the last survey was carried out, Stuttgart 21 has reached an advanced stage of planning; the publication of an Urban Development Framework Plan, expert evidence, geological and climate studies, the results of the station re-design competition have made concrete the changes and plans, a large-scale participatory process took place, and this was all linked with unusually broad, detailed reporting by the media." The city report went on to note what city leaders regarded as an irony—that environmentalists were among the most negative about the project, even though, according to the city administration, S21 would create significant improvements in Stuttgart's public transport system.[15]

A Long Interregnum

In 1998—three-and-a-half years after the first announcement of the project in April 1994—Stuttgart 21 ground to an abrupt halt, largely due to the departure of Deutsche Bahn CEO Dürr and the arrival of a new CEO, Johannes Ludewig, who held a very different philosophy. With other German mega-projects in difficulty and real estate sales sluggish, Ludewig was skeptical about how much money Deutsche Bahn would earn from real estate transactions—a major part of the financial rationale for the project. Analyzed purely as a transportation project, Stuttgart 21's costs far outweighed the benefits, he believed.[16] "I refused at that time to follow through on the

[12] Over time, a number of variants of K21 were proposed, but all shared the same basic concept: to keep the trains above ground and to modernize existing assets.

[13] Stuttgart report on 1995 citizen surveys, http://service.stuttgart.de/lhs-services/komunis/documents/2381_1_Die_Ergebnisse_der_Buer, retrieved July 14, 2014.

[14] Stuttgart report on 1997 citizen surveys, http://service.stuttgart.de/lhs-services/komunis/documents/2380_1_Die_Ergebnisse_der_Buer, retrieved July 14, 2014.

[15] "Kommunalpolitische Themen und Projekte im Meinungsbild, Ergebnisse der Bürgerumfrage 1997," by Thomas Schwarz, Statistics and Information Management, City of Stuttgart, 1997, p. 19, translated by Quinton Mayne, http://service.stuttgart.de/lhsservices/komunis/documents/2358_1_Kommunalpolitische_Themen_und_Projekte_im_Meinungsbild_1997.PDF, retrieved July 8, 2014.

[16] "Railway Station Mega-Projects as Public Controversies: The Case of Stuttgart 21," by Johannes Novy and Deike Peters, *Built Environment*, Vol. 38 No. 1, 2012, pp. 128-145,

Stuttgart 21 project at the expense of the other projects in Germany," Ludewig said a decade later.[17] Ludewig did not formally cancel Stuttgart 21, but effectively halted progress, delaying decisions about the project, and transferring many of the staff assigned to the project to other tasks.

Stuttgart 21's prospects further deteriorated after the October 1998 national elections. The federal government, governed for 16 years by a center-right coalition led by the Christian Democratic Union, was now governed by a center-left coalition led by the Social Democratic Party. Immediately, Baden-Württemberg, a longtime CDU stronghold, became, in the words of Dürr, "a B-list state."[18] State leaders continued to push Ludewig to follow through on the 1995 agreement. Ludewig responded that if Baden-Württemberg really wanted the project, the state should help to pay for it.

The Cost Share. When Ludewig proposed it, the idea of a federal/state cost-share for railway development was unprecedented in Germany, and Baden-Württemberg Premier Erwin Teufel initially rejected it out of hand. As the months rolled by, however, Teufel became increasingly concerned that, without cost-sharing, Stuttgart 21 would die on the shelf. Behind the scenes, therefore, he directed his Transport Minister to undertake cost-sharing negotiations with Deutsche Bahn. In February 2001, they announced a surprise breakthrough.

In parallel with these negotiations, the Stuttgart City Council, at the urging of Mayor Schuster, voted in May 1999 to enter negotiations to buy the redevelopment land from Deutsche Bahn. This would relieve Deutsche Bahn's anxiety about selling the land, said Schuster, and allow the citizens of Stuttgart to "decide without pressure what should be built"—an idea that had been explicitly recommended in the 1997 Open Participation Process. In December 2001, the city bought the lion's share of the parcel (about 210 acres) for €423 million. This was less than Deutsche Bahn had initially hoped to earn, but it also shifted the financial risks to the city.

Between 2001 and 2007, progress was slow, but finally, in July 2007, a formal Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the German Transport Minister, Deutsche Bahn CEO, Baden-Württemberg Premier, Stuttgart Mayor, and Stuttgart Regional Council to go forward with the €2.5 billion Stuttgart 21 project.[19] Under the contract, Baden-Württemberg agreed to pay €930 million.[20] Most of the rest was to be paid by Deutsche Bahn and the federal government. On February 2, 2010, 15 years, 9 months and 16 days after the initial framework agreement had been signed, Deutsche Bahn broke ground on Stuttgart 21.

Rising Public Protest: 2007-2010

Between 1995 and 2007, opposition to the Stuttgart 21 project had expanded to include a number of individuals and small organizations—mostly left-leaning environmental, transportation, and urban planning groups—but the total size of the opposition remained small. This, Rockenbauch said, was fairly typical of big urban projects. In

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http://www.geschundkunstgesch.tuberlin.de/fileadmin/fg95/Datein_von_Mitarbeitern/Deike/Novy_Peters_2012_BEV38N1_Stuttgart_21.pdf, retrieved August 28, 2013.

[17] Stuckenbrock, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p.39, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[18] Stuckenbrock, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p.36, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[19] The agreement was revised in April 2009 to reflect the new cost estimate of €4.1 billion. This sum did not include the cost of the Wendlingen-Ulm high-speed line, estimated at €2 billion.

[20] "Stuttgart 21 Survives Crucial Referendum," by Keith Barrow, International Railway Journal, http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/main-line/stuttgart-21-survives-crucial-referendum.html, retrieved August 27, 2013.

the early planning stages, the whole thing felt "very far away" to most city residents, he said. Thus, only a small, politicized group with a special interest in planning was moved to act. In the case of Stuttgart 21, he added, the pattern was exacerbated by continuing confusion over whether the project was "on" or "off." Officially, it had been "on" since 2001, but nothing appeared to be happening. In fact, there was some progress behind the scenes; project managers were taking care of myriad bureaucratic permits and reviews. But Deutsche Bahn, under the stewardship of Hartmut Mehdorn since the end of 1999, had turned its sights away from domestic infrastructure and toward expanding its global reach with transport acquisitions and logistics services abroad.[21] Given this broad priority shift, it was hard for state and local officials—to say nothing of the general citizenry—to decipher Deutsche Bahn's true intentions with respect to Stuttgart 21.

By 2007, however, the Stuttgart project appeared to be a "go" once more. In July, a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed by top government officials. At this point, the Green Party—which had voted against the project but taken no leadership position on the question—entered the fray with a petition drive calling for a public referendum in Stuttgart on the S21 project. For organizing purposes, the Greens worked with other anti-Stuttgart 21 groups to create the Alliance Against Stuttgart 21—nicknamed the K21 Alliance.[22] City officials warned the activists that, no matter how many signatures they gathered, the city would refuse to hold a referendum. Such a referendum had no legal basis, they argued; contracts had been signed, commitments had been made. Moreover, Stuttgart 21 was not just a city project—it was also a regional, state, and federal project, primarily financed from federal and state coffers.

The K21 Alliance persisted, however, submitting 67,000 signatures to the city in favor of a referendum (more than three times the number usually required to put a referendum on the ballot). In December 2007, the city formally voted not to hold a public referendum on the issue. This decision marked a turning point for the opposition. Over the next two years, polls showed that a broadening swath of the Stuttgart population was becoming disenchanted with the project. A poll taken in April 2008 indicated that city opinion was pretty evenly divided, pro and con, on Stuttgart 21. By the end of the year, the "con" point of view had risen to 68 percent.[23] The 2008-2009 global recession only added to public concern over the costs of the project. In a survey of Stuttgart 21 protesters, taken three years later, nearly a third reported that the city's refusal to allow the referendum in 2007 had spurred them to participate in demonstrations against the project.[24]

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[21] "Deutsche Bahn: Winter of Disconnect," *The Economist*, February 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18114823, retrieved August 29, 2013.

[22] The name was drawn from the 1997 plan, called K21, that presented a more modest alternative to the S21 train station. By this point, K21 referred less to a specific plan than to a general approach—upgrading the old station rather than replacing it, spending less money, and reducing the amount of re-development and disruption in Stuttgart.

[23] "Stuttgart 21's Tunnel Vision," by Oliver Lowenstein, *Unstructured.5/Sitelines*, online design blog, undated, http://www.fourthdoor.co.uk/unstructured/unstructured_05/sitelines/stuttgart21.php, retrieved August 28, 2013.

[24] Britta Baumgarten and Dieter Rucht conducted a survey of participants in an anti-Stuttgart 21 demonstration on October 18, 2010. Estimates of the size of the crowd ranged from 10,000 to 22,000. Baumgarten and Rucht distributed 1,500 surveys, of which 858 (57 percent) were returned in pre-paid envelopes. All results described here were drawn from "Die Protestierenden gegen 'Stuttgart 21'—einzigartig oder typisch?" by Britta Baumgarten & Dieter Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, eds. Frank Brettschneider and Wolfgang Schuster, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013, pp. 97-126, translated by Quinton Mayne.

In June 2009, the Green Party was the top vote-getter in Stuttgart city elections—a fact widely attributed to the Stuttgart 21 controversy.[25] Though the Greens came in only 1 percentage point above the CDU, the election marked the first time in Germany that the Greens had come in first in a city with more than 500,000 residents. Voter surveys indicated that the Stuttgart 21 issue was far more important for left-leaning voters than for center- and right-leaning voters, however. [See Exhibits 6 & 7.]

In September 2009, five months after becoming Deutsche Bahn CEO, Rüdiger Grube announced that a final decision would be made on Stuttgart 21 by the end of the year. The following month, the demonstrations against the project began in earnest.

The Stuttgart 21 Demonstrations

The demonstrations were held every Monday evening on the north side of the city's central train station. At first these events attracted just a handful of people but after the groundbreaking in February of the following year, they were held twice a week in front of the main station and drew thousands. By the summer of 2010 they were attracting tens of thousands.[26]As the demonstrations grew, their participants became more diverse, as did their reasons for opposing the project. Researchers Britta Baumgarten and Dieter Rucht conducted a survey of demonstrators in October 2010. Asked what had prompted them to join the rallies, respondents most commonly cited concern about project costs, which many viewed as unnecessarily high. The second most-cited reason was a belief that the project would be profitable for banks and companies, but not for average citizens. The third and fourth most popular reasons concerned the perceived top-down nature of the planning process. The public had been inadequately consulted in conceiving the plan, they argued. And—after the fact—public criticisms of the project had not been not taken seriously.[27] [See Exhibit 8.]

The organizers of the Stuttgart 21 opposition were well aware that the people demonstrating against the project were doing so for very different reasons. To minimize the impact of internal divisions within the alliance, the leadership chose to rally all parties around the issue of failures in the democratic process. They also held the reins loosely, giving grassroots organizations a free hand to mount their own actions under the mantle of the larger organization, provided they remained nonviolent.

Despite the size of the demonstrations, many public officials, including Stuttgart Mayor Schuster, were not inclined to take them seriously as a political statement. After all, it was summer, the weather was nice, and the organizers had created a kind of festival atmosphere, complete with live entertainment, colorful buttons and banners, and a cheerfully irreverent local beer called "Resist." "They had very good events in the Schloβgarten. Great music," said Schuster. "So people liked to go there because it was a social event."

The September 30, 2010 Debacle

By August and September 2010, as the Stuttgart 21 construction crews began to take actions that were irreversible, the demonstrations began to attract tens of thousands of participants. In August, a reported 20,000 peo-

[25] "Green Party and Free Democrats Gain in Germany's Local Elections," June 9, 1999, CityMayors.com/Politics/Elections, http://www.citymayors.com/politics/germany-elections-2009.html, retrieved August 23, 2013.

[26] Baumgarten & Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 97-126, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[27] Baumgarten & Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p. 109, translated by Quinton Mayne.

ple formed a human chain around the old train station in a failed attempt to prevent the demolition of the station's north wing, then marched to Stuttgart's City Hall. On September 30, the removal of several dozen of the historic plane trees was scheduled, and government officials knew that this was likely to cause the biggest protest yet. Protection of the trees was an emotional cause, especially dear to young people. A social media-fueled protest group called Parkschützer (Park Protectors), largely made up of students between the ages of 10 and 18, was determined to try to block the tree cutting. Some demonstrators sat in the branches of the trees marked for destruction. Others chained themselves to a chain link fence near the trees. Anticipating trouble, Baden-Württemberg Premier Stefan Mappus, who had taken office the preceding February, deployed riot police to the scene.

What caused the police to use water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray against the crowd was afterward disputed. The police initially claimed protestors had been throwing bottles and firecrackers at them, but by the following day, a police spokesman said only that protestors had thrown chestnuts. In the melee, some 128 people by official count—400 by unofficial count—were injured and at least one demonstrator was blinded—Dietricht Wagner, a 66-year-old retired engineer, who was reportedly sprayed in the face with a water cannon after lobbing chestnuts at police. A much-publicized photo showed Wagner being led from the crowd by friends, with blood streaming from his eyes.[28] [29] "With one photo, a regional dispute over an unpopular building project instantly transformed into a national issue," observed one reporter.[30] September 30 was dubbed "Black Thursday." The following day, the largest rally yet—estimated at 50,000 participants—took place in Stuttgart's Schloβgarten. A demonstration held a week later reportedly drew 100,000. Some demonstrators smeared red paint around their eyes, to protest police treatment of Wagner, but the demonstrations remained peaceful.

To Germans outside the area, the news reports from Stuttgart were mind-boggling. The people of Stuttgart and Baden-Württemberg had the reputation of being prosperous, orderly, and conservative. To see near-riot conditions there beggared belief. Observers struggled to understand how things could have gotten so out-of-hand.

Profile of a Protest Movement

In searching for a way to explain the Stuttgart demonstrations, many journalists noted that the activists did not match the usual protest profile—scruffy leftists, socialist academics, and students. Many in the Stuttgart crowds appeared to be retired or middle-aged professionals—stylish or dowdy, but comfortably-off and certainly not radical. Some journalists, including *Der Spiegel* reporter Dirk Kurbjuweit, suggested that something new was afoot in Germany—an older, prosperous-but-disaffected professional class, lashing out at societal change, protecting parochial self-interests, and distrustful of government. This notion seemed to dovetail with another trend in Germany—a somewhat obstreperous middleclass backlash against immigrants—especially Muslim immigrants. Kurbjuweit was credited with coining the term "Wutbürger," or "angry bourgeoisie," to describe this new group, a term that was voted German Word of the Year in 2010.

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[28] Lowenstein, *Unstructured.5/Sitelines*, undated. "Injured Stuttgart 21 Protestor could stay blind," *The Local/Germany*, October 6, 2010, http://www.thelocal.de/national/20101006-30295.html, retrieved August 28, 2013; "Blinded Stuttgart Protestor Threw Objects at Police, Video Reveals," *The Local/Germany*, October 7, 2010, http://www.thelocal.de/national/20101007-30351.html.

[29] Dietricht Wagner filed suit against the two police officers who ordered the use of the water cannons. That trial began in June 2014. "Court case puts police violence on trial," *Deutsche Welle*, June 13, 2014, http://www.dw.de/court-case-puts-police-violence-on-trial/a-17731023, retrieved July 8, 2014.

[30] "German Railway Controversy Sends Angela Merkel Off Track," by Tristana Moore, *Time Magazine*, October 8, 2010.

Not surprisingly, the K21 activists wholly rejected the Wutbürger label. Diverse they might be, but they saw themselves as standing up for democracy against an arrogant and overreaching political elite, and strongly denied that their actions were irrational, selfish, or rooted in reactionary fear and anger.

Academic researchers Britta Baumgarten and Dieter Rucht sought a clearer picture of the demonstrators and their motives. Relying on a voluntary self-report survey completed by 858 individuals, they concluded that the group attending an October 18, 2010 demonstration in Stuttgart—while perhaps more mainstream than other similar protests—was neither conservative nor new to politics. By comparison to the general population of either Stuttgart or Baden-Württemberg, they were more likely to be left-leaning with a history of political or civic involvement.[31] [See Exhibit 9.]

Mediation: October-November 2010

In the immediate aftermath of the violence, Mappus had declared his "full confidence in the police"[32] and remarked, "If mothers and children stand in the way of police, then they should expect to be removed with physical violence."[33] Deutsche Bahn CEO Rüdiger Grube told a journalist that the Stuttgart 21 project had been "democratically legitimized" and that no one had the "right to resist" the construction of a railway station. "Here parliaments decide, no one else. Our democratically-elected legislators have done it a dozen times—at state, federal, and regional levels."[34]

But Germany's CDU Chancellor, Angela Merkel, struck a less defiant tone. The previous month, she had lent her support to Stuttgart 21—an uncharacteristic move for Merkel, as she usually stayed clear of local political conflicts. In the wake of the police violence, the CDU took a beating in the press, with some observers speculating that the issue might lose Merkel her political coalition (already weakened by infighting). The day after the September 30 demonstration, Merkel said, "I would like it if such demonstrations proceeded peacefully. Anything that could lead to violence has to be avoided."[35] In retrospect, Schuster surmised that Mappus thought a show of force would make it clear to the protesters that they would never stop the project.

On October 6—under pressure from Merkel, according to one source[36]—Mappus announced that he had appointed the widely respected 80-year-old Heiner Geiβler, retired veteran conservative politician and one-time CDU secretary general, to serve as a mediator in discussions between proponents and opponents of the project. Geiβler had a reputation for reaching across party lines, having successfully mediated difficult labor disputes in the past. Mappus also promised that no further demolition or tree-clearing would occur at the site until after state elections in March 2011.

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[31] Baumgarten & Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 97-126, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[32] "Fresh demos in German city after bloody clashes," Agence France Presse, October 1, 2010.

[33] "Merkel alarmed by violence at Stuttgart station," Reuters, October 1, 2010.

[34] "Stuttgart 21 railway protests to continue," Deutsche Welle, October 4, 2010.

[35] "Germany shocked by 'disproportionate' police action in Stuttgart," Spiegel Online International, October 1, 2010.

[36] Lowenstein, *Unstructured.5/Sitelines*, undated.

Not all the protest groups in the K21 alliance supported the mediation. The youthful Parkschützer group, credited with a major mobilization of protesters in August and September demonstrations, viewed it as a strategic mistake to participate in a process they believed was intended to pacify the protesters without ceding any ground on the Stuttgart rail project. The Green Party and the rest of the alliance, however, threw their support behind the mediation. In comments to the state parliament on October 6, 2010, however, Green Party Chair Winfried Kretschmann held elected officials culpable for the Stuttgart 21 imbroglio: "Believe me, the main source of the protest movement is that you are not taking the protest seriously at all and that you think that the opponents don't have any good arguments."[37]

Over the course of nine day-long mediation sessions spanning five weeks—which Geiβler called "fact-checking" sessions—seven proponents of Stuttgart 21 and seven opponents met to exchange questions and information. Proponents included Mappus, the state Transport Minister, and a top-level executive from Deutsche Bahn. Opponents included opposition spokesman Hannes Rockenbauch, representatives of the Green Party and SPD, and an environmental activist. The sessions were held in City Hall, with overflow seating before a large outdoor screen. In addition, the sessions were broadcast on television, the radio, and the internet. Geiβler repeatedly exhorted participants to speak in lay language, but much of the discussion was dry and technical in nature. Still, public interest was high. According to one survey, 34 percent of respondents reported the highest possible level of interest in the mediation (7 on a 7-point scale) and another 45 percent reported medium-high interest levels (6). The overwhelming majority—83 percent—reported that they had seen, read, or heard something about the mediation process in the media, and 58 percent said they had discussed the mediation with others.[38]

At the conclusion of the mediation, on November 30, 2010, Geiβler recommended a few nonbinding revisions to the plan,[39] and the commission of an independent "stress test" to verify Deutsche Bahn's claim that the new station would be able to meet the needed volume of train traffic. In general, however, he stated that a compromise between the two sides was not possible, that government officials had followed the procedures required under law, and that the project was by this point so advanced, it would cost €1-1.5 billion in damages and fines to cancel it. "That's a lot of money for which we get nothing in return," Geiβler noted. His final conclusion: Stuttgart 21 should go forward.[40] On the other hand, he remarked, "The world is different after Stuttgart 21. No future government will be able to push through a project the way Stuttgart 21 was pushed through. Politics will be forced to consider not only technological and economic advantages but also the impact on people."[41]

The ruling was widely viewed as a victory for Stuttgart 21 proponents. In an online survey of 426 Stuttgart-area residents, about half of Stuttgart 21 opponents reported disappointment in the outcome, but the vast majori-

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[37] "Die 'Schlichtung' zu 'Stuttgart 21'—Wahrnehmungen und Bewertungen durch die Bevölkerung," by Frank Brettschneider, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, eds. Frank Brettschneider and Wolfgang Schuster, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013, p.185, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[38] The online survey was sent to 1,039 people in October 2010. Initially, 558 people took part. At the close of the mediation, these 558 were sent a second survey; 426 took part. Brettschneider, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 185-208, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[39] For example, two more platforms, better fire safety, and creation of a public land trust to protect the urban redevelopment area from real estate speculation.

[40] "CDU Wary after Stuttgart Rail Appeal," by Gerrit Wiesmann, *Financial Times*, November 30, 2010.

[41] Novy and Peters, *Built Environment*, Vol. 38 No. 1, 2012, pp. 128-145.

ty of respondents were positively disposed to the mediation process, and protest activity calmed significantly afterward.[42] [See Exhibit 10.] Another survey of Baden-Württemberg residents indicated that the proportion opposed to Stuttgart 21 dropped considerably between September and December 2010, from 54 to 38 percent. Opinion on the question, however, varied dramatically by party affiliation.[43] [See Exhibit 11.]

Uwe Stuckenbrock, then head of the Stuttgart's Planning Department, argued one of the most useful aspects of the mediation was the chance it gave everyday citizens to see experts from Deutsche Bahn presenting well-researched and thoughtful information about a complex set of issues. "They were not people with horns on," he said. "They were normal people and were eager to convince other people, and very friendly." In Geiβler's view, "The important goal of the mediation was to regain some credibility and trust in democracy through the laying out of objective facts in a new form of unmediated democracy."[44]

A Pivotal State Election: March 27, 2011

If the mediation process had succeeded in calming frayed nerves in Stuttgart, the March 27, 2011 state election came as a shock—especially to the Baden-Württemberg political establishment. Although the CDU still won a plurality of votes, its center-right CDU-FDP coalition was unseated by a coalition of the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party, ending 58 years of unbroken CDU political leadership in the state. The Greens were the big winners, gaining 19 seats—primarily at the expense of the CDU and FDP, but also at the expense of the center-left SPD, which had historically been far stronger in Baden-Württemberg than the Greens. As a result, for the first time in German history, a state had a Green premier, Winfried Kretschmann.[45] [See Exhibit 12.]

Stuttgart 21 was a factor in the March election but not, by most accounts, the decisive factor. More important was the Fukushima nuclear disaster, which occurred 16 days before the election on March 11, 2011, stirring up fears about aging nuclear power plants in Germany. What's more, Baden-Württemberg Premier Mappus had, a few months earlier, controversially invested state funds in local nuclear power plants. The incident tilted opinion against the CDU, an historic supporter of nuclear power, and toward the Greens, an historic opponent of it. Voter surveys indicated that 30 to 40 percent of the electorate decided whom to support only in the last two weeks before the election.[46]

Though Stuttgart 21 was not decisive statewide, it was important for a critical subset of voters. Surveys indicated that—while only 29 percent of voters statewide listed Stuttgart 21 as an important issue for the election—that number was much higher (47 percent) in the greater Stuttgart area. Nonetheless, even Stuttgart voters—

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[42] Brettschneider, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 185-208, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[43] "'Stuttgart 21': die baden-württembergische Landtagswahl und die Volkabstimmung 2011," by Frank Brettschneider and Thomas Schwarz, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, eds. Frank Brettschneider and Wolfgang Schuster, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013, pp. 261-298, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[44] Novy and Peters, *Built Environment,* Vol. 38 No. 1, 2012, pp. 128-145.

[45] Data retrieved from the Statistisches Amt der Stadt Stuttgart (City of Stuttgart Office of Statistics): http://www.stuttgart.de/wahldaten.

[46] Brettschneider in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 185-208, translated by Quinton Mayne.

asked (before the nuclear accident in Japan) which issues they regarded as "important or very important" in the election—chose other issues over Stuttgart 21:[47]

- Education policy (86.1%)
- Energy and environmental policy (75.5%)
- Economic policy (62.6%)
- Unemployment (60.3%)
- Stuttgart 21 (50.0%)

More than two-thirds of Stuttgart's Green voters (69.1%), however, ranked Stuttgart 21 as an important or very important issue in the election. What's more, among Stuttgart voters who said they planned to switch their vote to the Green Party in the March election, 38 percent indicated that they were doing so because of Stuttgart 21.

Whether or not the Stuttgart 21 controversy brought the Greens to power in March, the election had an undeniable impact on the Stuttgart 21 controversy. Given that the SPD, the Greens' coalition partner, was a supporter of Stuttgart 21, the two parties had to hammer out a compromise on the issue. In their coalition agreement, the two parties announced:

> The new state government stands despite disagreement over Stuttgart 21 and the new railway line between Wendlingen and Ulm. Each party respects the position of the other and both are united in their desire to pacify the conflict and overcome the divide that this has created in society. For these reasons, both parties give their backing to the holding of a referendum. Citizens should decide […] The goal of the referendum is to arrive at a final and peaceful judgment regarding Stuttgart 21.[48]

The Stuttgart 21 Referendum: November 27, 2011

In Baden-Württemberg, use of the public referendum vehicle was rare. Only three state-wide referendums had taken place in the preceding 60 years.[49] Nonetheless, in surveys conducted between October 2010 and August 2012, 70 percent of Baden-Württemberg residents expressed support for holding the Stuttgart 21 referendum. Among the Stuttgart 21 opposition, that number rose to 90 percent, but even among project proponents, 40 percent supported it.[50]

That said, the bar for victory was very high for the Stuttgart 21 opposition. Not only did a voting majority have to approve the measure, but at least one-third of all 7.6 million eligible voters also had to do so. Other recent ref-

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[47] From a survey of just over 300 respondents carried out from the end of January through the middle of February, 2011. Brettschneider and Schwarz, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p. 264, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[48] Stuckenbrock in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p. 48, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[49] The first, in 1951, was the referendum that created the state in the first place, by merging three territories. The second, in 1970, determined that Baden should remain a part of Baden- Württemberg. The third, in 1971, dissolved Baden- Württemberg's upper house of parliament.

[50] "Jenseits der Volksabstimmung: Einstellungen zu 'Stuttgart 21'und zur Demokratie in Baden-Württemberg, 2010-2012," by Thorsten Faas and Johannes N. Blumenberg, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, eds. Frank Brettschneider and Wolfgang Schuster, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013, p. 310, translated by Quinton Mayne.

erendums in Germany had drawn a turnout rate of only 30 to 40 percent, altogether, so—in order to win—the Stuttgart 21 opposition had to achieve a very high turnout as well as an overwhelming vote.

A lively campaign ensued. Stung by its electoral loss the preceding March, the CDU mounted a vigorous campaign in support of the S21 project, mobilizing the party base, especially in rural areas of the state. Every household in the state received a pamphlet in which each side presented its 10 most salient arguments.

In the end, the turnout for the referendum was relatively high—48 percent statewide; 68 percent in Stuttgart. To the surprise of proponents and opponents alike, however, the final tally—59-41 percent against the referendum (and therefore in favor of Stuttgart 21)—was decisive. Statewide, the referendum was approved in only seven of the state's 44 electoral districts—all in larger cities or university towns where the Green Party was strong. Even in Stuttgart, the referendum was defeated 53-47 percent. (In Stuttgart wards dominated by the Green Party—where turnout averaged 71 percent—the referendum was approved 53-47 percent, however.)

The vote against Stuttgart 21 was relatively higher in Baden, where residents believed Stuttgart 21 would suck resources away from their own regional railway improvements, and lower in districts that were close to the new high-speed line and therefore stood to benefit from it.

After the fact, the Stuttgart 21 opposition criticized various aspects of the referendum process. The wording was convoluted, they argued. To vote against Stuttgart 21, a voter had to vote yes to the question, "Do you agree with the draft legislation that would allow for the termination of contractual agreements related to the railway project Stuttgart 21? (Yes or No)"[51] In addition, they criticized public authorities for taking a position against the referendum, rather than remaining neutral. Stuttgart Mayor Schuster sent materials to all Stuttgart households urging a "no" vote. The Stuttgart Regional Council also sent out a pro-Stuttgart 21 brochure, and put pro-Stuttgart 21 signs in the city's metro.

As soon as the votes were in, however, Baden-Württemberg Premier Kretschmann declared that—despite opposing the project himself—he and the Green Party would honor the result. "The people have spoken. We will accept this vote. The whole state government will do so," he said. At the same time, he sent one shot across Deutsche Bahn's bow: the state would not pay any more than the €930 million already agreed, whether or not costs escalated; Deutsche Bahn would have to cover the rest.[52]

Resolved and Yet Maybe Not Resolved

While anti-Stuttgart 21 demonstrations continued after the referendum, they were far smaller in size and intensity than those of 2010; the referendum vote was widely viewed as the final word on public opinion on the question. But some observers remained skeptical about whether, in the end, Stuttgart 21 would be built. In February 2013, the media had buzzed with rumors that Merkel might withdraw support from the project. *Der Spiegel* reported that Germany's Transport, Finance, and Economic Ministers descended on Deutsche Bahn headquarters, where they grilled the railway CEO, Rüdiger Grube, for four hours over cost projections and other aspects of the

[51] Translated by Quinton Mayne.

[52] "Bid to halt Stuttgart 21 rail project fails," The Local, November 27, 2011, http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20111127-39151.html, retrieved August 23, 2013.

plan. "Stunned by this expression of mistrust from his government watchdogs, [Grube asked them], 'Does the government still support Stuttgart 21?'" according to the *Der Spiegel* account.[53]

By March 2013, Deutsche Bahn announced that the official price tag of Stuttgart 21 had risen from €4.1 in 2009 to €6.5 billion and the anticipated completion date had been pushed back to 2022. The state of Baden-Württemberg reaffirmed its unwillingness to pay any more than it had already committed. The Deutsche Bahn board reaffirmed its continued commitment to Stuttgart 21, however.[54] As of the summer of 2014, construction work on the project was underway.

[53] "Losing Steam: Massive Rail Project Haunts Merkel Campaign," by Sven Böll, et al., Spiegel Online, February 13, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/future-of-stuttgart-station-project-in-question-as-berlin-pulls-back-a-882330.html, retrieved August 29, 2013.

[54] "Stuttgart rail project splutters again," The Local, July 24, 2013, http://www.thelocal.de/national/20130724-51021.html, retrieved August 23, 2013.

Exhibit 1. Primary People Mentioned in this Case

- Stuttgart
  - Wolfgang Schuster, CDU Mayor from 1997-2013
  - Uwe Stuckenbrock, former head of the city's Planning Department
  - Hannes Rockenbach, councilor since 2004, member and cofounder of Stuttgart Ökologisch Sozial party**,** spokesperson for Alliance against Stuttgart 21
  - Winfried Wolf, former Transportation Spokesperson for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)

- Baden-Württemberg
  - Erwin Teufel, CDU premier, 1991-2005
  - Günther Oettinger, CDU premier, 2005-2010
  - Stefan Mappus, CDU premier, 2010-2011
  - Winfried Kretschmann, Green Party premier, 2011-present

- Deutsche Bahn—publicly owned German railway company
  - Heinz Dürr, CEO 1993-1998
  - Johannes Ludewig, CEO, 1998-1999
  - Hartmut Mehdorn, CEO, 1999-2009
  - Rüdiger Grube, CEO, 2009-present

- Germany
  - Heiner Geiβler—retired CDU politician, appointed Stuttgart 21 mediator

Primary Political Parties in Germany

- Christian Democratic Union (CDU), leading center-right party
- Social Democratic Party (SPD), leading center-left party
- Green Party, left-leaning party
- Free Democratic Party (FDP), center-right party

Exhibit 2. Chronology of Stuttgart 21

- 1988, Bundesbahn proposes plan for Stuttgart segment of high-speed rail to Baden-Württemberg.
- 1989, Baden-Württemberg rejects plan.
- April 1994, Heinz Dürr and government officials announce Stuttgart 21 project at a surprise press conference.
- November 1995, Deutsche Bahn together with federal, state, regional, and city governments sign a financial agreement for Stuttgart 21.
- November 1995, critics voice objections to the Stuttgart 21 plan.
- 1996-1997, city authorities oversee development of a "master design" for the new urban area.
- March to June 1997, city authorities hold Open Participation Process, allowing 400 interested citizens to add their ideas to the master design.
- July 1997, City Council approves amended master design.
- 1998, Stuttgart 21 critics develop an alternative proposal, Kopfbahnhof 21, or K21.
- 1998-2001, project on hold.
- February 2001, Deutsche Bahn, federal Transport Ministry, and Baden-Württemberg agree on a preliminary cost-sharing arrangement.
- December 2001, City of Stuttgart buys 210 acres from Deutsche Bahn for €423 million.
- 2001-2007, project moving slowly; Deutsche Bahn focused on becoming a global logistics company.
- July 2007, Memorandum of Understanding signed by Deutsche Bahn, German Transport Ministry, Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart, and Stuttgart Regional Council.
- November 2007, Alliance against Stuttgart 21 amasses 67,000 signatures in favor of a city referendum on the Stuttgart 21 project.
- December 2007, Stuttgart City Council rejects request for a referendum about Stuttgart 21, citing legal barriers.
- April 2009, agreement modified to reflect new cost estimate of €4.1 billion.
- June 2009, Green Party is the top vote-getter in Stuttgart city elections—an historic first, though the Greens only beat the CDU by 1 percentage point.
- September 2009, Deutsche Bahn CEO Rüdiger Grube announces final decision on Stuttgart 21 by year's end.
- October 2009, weekly demonstrations against Stuttgart 21 begin in the Schloβgarten, next to the train station.
- February 2010, Deutsche Bahn breaks ground on Stuttgart 21.
- Summer 2010, demonstrations draw crowds in the thousands and tens of thousands.
- September 30, 2010, demonstration to prevent tree-clearing turns violent.
- October 6, 2010, Baden-Württemberg Premier Stefan Mappus appoints Heiner Geiβler to mediate dispute.
- October-November 2010, mediation sessions take place, broadcast on television, radio, and the internet.
- November 30, 2010, with a few provisos, Geiβler concludes Stuttgart 21 should go forward.
- March 17, 2011, in state elections, left-center coalition of Green Party and SPD unseats CDU-led coalition.
- November 27, 2011, state-wide referendum to cancel Stuttgart 21 contracts fails, 59-41 percent.
- February 2013, rumors spread that Chancellor Angela Merkel may pull her support from the Stuttgart 21.
- March 2013, cost estimates for the Stuttgart 21 project now €6.5 billion. Deutsche Bahn reaffirms its commitment to the project. Baden-Württemberg said the state will not pay more than the €930 million already committed.

Exhibit 3. High-Speed Rail in West Germany, 1945-1988[55]

In industrialized countries, many railway systems—including then-West Germany's state-run Bundesbahn—found themselves in difficult straits after World War II, with aging infrastructure and falling revenues as passengers increasingly opted to travel by car or plane. In this context, high-speed rail, under development in Europe since the 1970s, represented a hoped-for chance to win back market share. France led the way with a highly successful network of high-speed trains running between major cities by the 1980s. In West Germany, however, progress was slower.

For one thing, German terrain is more mountainous. Because high-speed trains could not handle sharp curves, the Bundesbahn either had to tunnel through the mountains (complex and expensive) or accept lower speeds. West Germany was also more densely settled than France, with many more mid-sized to large cities, all demanding upgraded rail service. Under West Germany's federal system, government was decentralized, which gave state governments significant control over the development of infrastructure projects in their territory. In short, while fast travel was arguably the essence of high-speed rail, West Germany had been forced to strike a balance among several competing interests—maximizing travel speed, minimizing costs, and serving local needs.[56]

West Germany had opted for an integrated system, in most cases upgrading its old rail lines to accommodate high-speed trains rather than building new ones, and often bowing to local political wishes for multiple stops. The Bundesbahn continued to feel pressure to minimize travel times, however. Studies indicated that fast trains could win back as much as 80 percent of the market share from planes for relatively short-distance travel, provided the train ride took no more than three hours. Nonstop trains between major cities had proved critical to France's high-speed rail success, but in West Germany, "unfortunately, the trains have to stop for every mayor," according to Peter Mnich, a rail expert at Berlin's Technical University.[57]

By the late 1980s, West Germany had a patchwork system, with high-speed capacity on only some stretches of rail. A piece at a time, the Bundesbahn—badly in debt from mounting costs and low ridership— expanded its high-speed network. Priorities for these projects were set out by the federal Transport Ministry in its periodically-updated Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. Once the Bundesbahn had drawn up a proposal for a particular project, it was submitted to the appropriate state government for review. Not until the director of the Bundesbahn and the state premier were in accord would the proposal proceed to a full feasibility study.

[55] After World War II, West Germany and East Germany were separate countries until reunification in 1990.

[56] "High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad," by Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel, Working Paper, Research Institute of Applied Economics, Barcelona, March 2010, http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2010/201003.pdf, retrieved August 28, 2013.

[57] "Molasses-Speed Rail: Why trains go a lot faster in France than in Germany," by Christian Wüst, Spiegel Online, June 11, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/molasses-speed-rail-why-trains-go-a-lot-faster-in-france-than-in-germany-a-487889.html, retrieved August 24, 2013. According to this article, it had become a "running joke" in Germany that the high-speed line from Frankfurt to Cologne included stops for towns with populations of 34,000 and 12,500, respectively.

Exhibit 4. Unopposed Recommendations from the Open Participation Process

Mixed use of space

1. Stronger mix of housing and work
2. Increase share of land given over to housing
3. Mix housing, work, education, culture, free time, care in order to ensure that new areas are lively at all times of the day; more emphasis on "urbanity" and safety
4. No mono-structures
5. Shorter distance between housing, places of work, places of education, culture, leisure, and care

Small parcels

1. Smaller parcels to ensure liveliness and guard against anonymity
2. Smaller parcels to increase the chance of variety and mixed use of space
3. Smaller parcels to ensure adaptability and flexibility
4. Set a maximum number of parcels that can be owned by individual investors, thereby preventing mono-structures

Differentiation of housing stock

1. Affordable housing
2. Multi-generational housing
3. Family-friendly housing
4. Connecting housing with work
5. Leave space for new forms of housing and experimental housing design

Social sustainability

1. Social mixing
2. Integration instead of segregation
3. Sustainably self-regulating social structures
4. Good social structures for all age groups

Water conservation and climate protection

1. Conservation of mineral water source
2. Conservation of ground water
3. Preservation of the flow of surface and storm water
4. Return to nature ("renaturation") of the Störzbach valley and Nesenbach stream
5. Improvement of the city's climate rather than preventing further degradation
6. Do not impair the circulation of fresh air
7. Minimizing the emission of pollutants from domestic sources and traffic
8. Use of renewable energy
9. Implementation of a "Local Agenda 21" for Stuttgart

Green planning for the whole area

1. A priori green planning for the whole area as a coherent overall concept
2. Increase the size of the park
3. Have larger green spaces rather than narrow green corridors
4. Greening of roofs, and making these green roofs publicly accessible

Ensuring consistent development with Stuttgart as a whole

1. No large built structures such as SüdwestLB building
2. Keep through views unobscured and produce visual relationships
3. Ensure that architecture fits with background topography
4. Diversity of construction types
5. Conscious choices of materials and colors
6. Balance in the size of buildings and roads

Communication and encounters in open space

1. Squares that enhance quality of life and serve as neighborhoods centers
2. Large inner courtyards
3. Attractive, interesting paths
4. Streets, paths, squares, and parks that allow for cultural activities and non-commercialized free time activities
5. "Socialization-friendly" streets

Identity of the new part of town

1. Give new part of town a name that produces sense of community belonging
2. Should have its own neighborhood town hall
3. Pay attention to street names
4. Ensure continuation of old uses

Ensuring environmentally friendly and safe mobility without barriers

1. Attractive foot and cycle paths
2. Increase share enjoyed by public transit
3. Efficient and attractive public transit network connecting with existing S-bahn, tram, and U-Bahn systems.
4. No through traffic and minimization of single-person vehicular traffic
5. No on-street parking and reduction in number of parking spaces
6. Creation of car-free and reduced-traffic quarters
7. Make the railway station bike-friendly
8. Ensure roads, paths, squares, parks, and buildings are barrier-free

Connecting the new parts with the old parts of the city

1. Ensure that S21 doesn't turn into a burden on other parts of the city
2. Implement preservation orders for the surrounding neighborhoods
3. Create clear lines of view through to the surrounding (hill?) landscape
4. Use the railway station as the hinge of the old and new parts of the city

Further processes and implementations

1. City must have an active land policy
2. Do not give into commercial pressure
3. Quality must be assured through creation of a special project group and a checklist for investors
4. (Design) contests/competitions should be held
5. Environmental impact assessments must be carried out at every planning stage
6. Financial viability of infrastructure and transport projects should be established

Participation

1. Citizen participation should be continued
2. Participatory process should take place in adjacent neighborhoods
3. A Women's Advisory Council should be set up
4. Participatory process for residents should be created
5. Plans and designs should be presented in a way that citizens can easily understand

Exhibit 5. Chief Council Amendments to the Revised Urban Redevelopment Framework Plan

1. Forwarded by the city administration – re: Chapter 4 – "In view of the historical built characteristics of Stuttgart, due attention should be taken of the fact that the central public square forms the city center in both form and function. As a result, consideration must be given as to whether the new northern railway square should be built and transformed in any special way so as to become the second central inner-city center. The creation of the northern railway square poses the additional challenge of how best to connect the Schlossgarten with the squares that comprise the Castle Square (namely, the Schillerplatz, Market Square, Karlsplatz, and the Lower Castle Square)."
2. Forwarded by the CDU – re: Chapter 5 – "Corporate enterprises are sought for [Land parcel] A1 and have priority."
3. Forwarded by the Green party – re: Chapter 7 – "It is the basis and explicit goal of subsequent planning for Stuttgart 21 that at least 60% of long-distance traffic will come from individuals arriving via local public transit. Options laid out below (e.g., Nordkreuz, Gäubahntrasse, etc.) are conditions that allow for the achievement of this goal and therefore should remain on the planning table."
4. Forwarded by the CDU – re: Chapter 8.3 – "In [land parcel] A1, it may be useful to connect the proposed underground car parks. Creating a system to manage parking spaces is conceivable."
5. Forwarded by the CDU – re: Chapter 8.3 – "The number of parking spaces is to be established pragmatically depending on use; underground parking spaces for buses are possible."
6. Forwarded by the Greens – re: Chapter 8.3 – "Any parking spaces that are called for are as a general rule to be underground."
7. Forwarded by the Greens – re: Chapter 8.4 – "It is intended that the flow of service vehicles will be handled in this area in an environmentally friendly way by the city's traffic logistics unit."
8. Forwarded by the Greens – re: Chapter 11.2 – "The energy and resource requirements of this area will be minimized through low-energy-consumption building standards. In later construction phases passive-house standards will be planned for."
9. Forwarded by the Greens – re: Chapter 11.2 –In essence, the replacement of one sentence—"A deterioration in the quality of ground water and mineral water is to be avoided"—with much more detailed wording stating that the area will be managed as if it were a legally protected water conservation area. A further addition called for the creation of a Crisis Committee and action plan to address any accidental increases in man-made contaminants in the water.
10. Forwarded by the Greens – re: Chapter 15 – The following sentence is to be replaced: "In keeping with the legal protections afforded to certain monuments, it remains to be determined if and to what extent these legal protections can be overruled." New sentence: "Where possible, tracks that are important from the point of view of railway heritage, natural sites, as well as individual monuments will be protected and preserved."

Exhibit 6. Results by Party Compared to Preceding City Election in 2004[58]

Party	Vote Share	Percentage-Point Change in Vote Share from 2004	# Seats Won	Change in # Seats Won
Green Party	25.3	+6.6	16	+5
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	24.3	-8.6	15	-6
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	17.0	-5.8	10	-4
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	10.9	+4.4	6	+2
Independent (no party affiliation)	10.3	+0.4	7	+1
SÖS (anti-Stuttgart 21 party)	4.6	+2.9	3	+2
The Left	4.5	+2.7	2	+1
Republicans	2.5	-1.4	1	-1
Others	0.6	-1.4	0	0
Election Turnout	48.7%			

Exhibit 7. Importance of Stuttgart 21 in the Stuttgart 2009 Election, by Party[59]

Party Affiliation	Percent of surveyed voters who said the Stuttgart 21 issue had influenced their vote in the 2009 city election
FDP	20
CDU	24
SPD	29
The Left	52
Green Party	63
SÖS	89

[58] Data retrieved from the Statistisches Amt der Stadt Stuttgart (City of Stuttgart Office of Statistics), http://www.stuttgart.de/wahldaten.

[59] Brettschneider and Schwarz, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p.266, translated by Quinton Mayne.

Exhibit 8. Selected Findings, Baumgarten/Rucht Survey, Protestor Motives for Demonstrating[60]

Ranking	Frequency of Response
Project costs	395
Profit only for banks and companies	284
Democracy deficits in planning process	261
Democracy deficits in dealing with project criticism	262
Capacity (the planned eight platforms would be inadequate to handle the planned passenger traffic)	235
Geological dangers	190
Financial consequences for other train projects (by demanding so many resources, Stuttgart 21 would effectively pre-empt other more important rail projects)	158
Negative impact on local traffic	153
Ecology (including increased heat from dense downtown development and the loss of 280 trees, many between 100 and 300 years old)	144
Negative consequences for water protection	111
Monument protection (upset at the planned demolition of two-thirds of the existing historic train station)	65
Noise and traffic troubles during construction	41

[60] Britta Baumgarten and Dieter Rucht conducted a survey of participants in an anti-Stuttgart 21 demonstration on October 18, 2010. Estimates of the size of the crowd ranged from 10,000 to 22,000. Baumgarten and Rucht distributed 1,500 surveys, of which 858 (57 percent) were returned in pre-paid envelopes. Baumgarten & Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p. 109, translated by Quinton Mayne.

Exhibit 9. Selected Findings, Baumgarten/Rucht Survey, Assessing Characteristics of the Protestors[61]

- Place of residence: 98% Baden-Württemberg; 68% Stuttgart.
- Education: Higher than in the population at large, but similar to other political demonstrations. About 50 percent held a university degree and 4 percent a PhD.
- Unemployed: 4%
- Retired: 14%
- Political leaning: 55% left-leaning; 37% middle of the spectrum.
- Party chosen in last federal election: 49% Green Party; 15% Left Party
- Previously involved in civic association: 79%.
- Previously involved in a political organization: 51%
- Had contacted a politician or government official in the past year: 36%
- Had signed a petition in the last year: 82%
- Had given money to a political organization in the last year: 64%
- Had taken part in "direct action" in the past (primarily anti-war and environmental issues): 43%
- Believed civil disobedience justifiable in the case of Stuttgart 21: 93%
- Spurred to participate in the Stuttgart 21 demonstrations by the city's refusal to hold a referendum on the project in 2007: 32%
- Spurred to participate in the Stuttgart 21 demonstrations by the demolition of the north wing of the old railway station in August 2010: 42%

[61] Baumgarten & Rucht, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 97-126, translated by Quinton Mayne.

Exhibit 10. Selected Findings from Online Panel Survey about the Mediation Process[62]

- Before the mediation, 37% were in favor of Stuttgart 21; 47% against; 16% neutral or undecided.
- After the mediation, 43% were in favor of Stuttgart 21; 43% against; 14% neutral or undecided.
- 83% viewed role and conduct of Geiβler as positive.
- 54% were positive about Geiβler's conclusion; 28% negative; 18% neutral or undecided.
    - Among Stuttgart 21 proponents, 88% were positive about Geiβler's conclusion; 5% negative; 7% neutral or undecided.
    - Among Stuttgart 21 opponents, 24% were positive about Geiβler's conclusion; 51% negative; 25% neutral or undecided.
    - Among citizens neutral or undecided about Stuttgart 21, 35% were positive about Geiβler's conclusion; 25% negative; 40% neutral or undecided.
- On a 7-point scale, 68% were positive about the mediation overall (5-7), 14% negative (1-3), and 18% neutral (4).
- 62% did not believe the mediation had been a cosmetic exercise or show; 18% thought it had.
- 77% agreed that the mediation was a step in the right direction, 8% disagreed, and 15% were undecided.
- 58% agreed that they were better informed about Stuttgart 21 after the mediation.
- Before the mediation, 67% thought that more information should be provided about Stuttgart 21; afterward, that number dropped to 45%.

[62] The online survey was sent to 1,039 people in October 2010. Initially, 558 people took part. At the close of the mediation, these 558 were sent a second survey; 426 took part. Brettschneider in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 185-208, translated by Quinton Mayne.

Exhibit 11. Position on Stuttgart 21 in December 2010, by Party Affliliation[63]

Party Affiliation	Pro-Stuttgart 21, December 2010 (%)	Anti-Stuttgart 21, December 2010 (%)
CDU	83	13
FDP	70	27
SPD	52	38
Left Party	32	63
Green Party	25	66

Exhibit 12. March 27, 2011 Election Results, Compared to Preceding State Election, by Party[64]

Party	% share of vote	%-point change	# seats won	Change in # seats won
CDU	39	-5.2	60	-9
Green Party	24.2	+12.5	36	+19
SPD	23.1	-2.1	35	-3
FDP	5.3	-5.4	7	-8
Die Linke	2.8	-.3		
Pirate	2.1	+2.1		
Republicans	1.1	-1.4		
Others	2.4			
Voter Turnout	66.3%	+12.8%		
Voter Turnout in Stuttgart	73.1%	+ 16.1%		

[63] Brettschneider in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, pp. 185-208, translated by Quinton Mayne.

[64] Brettschneider and Schwarz, in *Stuttgart 21: Ein Großprojekt zwischen Protest und Akzeptanz*, p.266, translated by Quinton Mayne.